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This article explores who has most skillfully used the rules of the global 
economic regime — China, or the nations whose companies invest in her? 
We first analyse China’s adoption and implementation of WTO 
commitments in the automotive industry and the cultural goods sector. We 
then consider the liberalisation of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) 
scheme and China’s use of FDI as a vehicle to acquire foreign technology, 
while also restricting FDI to protect the domestic banking sector. Finally, 
we analyse China’s engagement with the international financial regime, 
particularly its exchange rate policy, and whether this too represents a 
strategic implementation of reforms. Based on these four case studies, we 
conclude that while the West initially dictated the terms of China’s 
interaction with the global economic system, over time, China has deftly 
engaged with global rules so as to promote its own national interests. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
This project arose from the question of who had more adroitly 
used the international trade, investment and financial regimes – 
China or the nations whose companies invest in her? 
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) has predicted that China’s economy may 
well, on a purchasing power parity basis, become the largest in the 
world by 2016.1 However, the particular question we were interested 
in pursuing was not who has grown the most, or profited the most, 
from investments made in China. The question was who has most 
skillfully negotiated the rules governing China’s interaction with the 
rest of the world, and then most skillfully implemented and applied 
those rules? 
To answer the question, this article analyzes the process of 
China’s opening up to the world in two periods: its unilateral 
opening-up from 1979 to 2001, and its later period of liberalization 
occasioned by its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
in 2001. The article analyzes these issues in the three principal 
sectors of the international economic legal order: trade, investment 
                                                
1 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(OECD), Balance of economic power will shift dramatically over the next 50 years, says 
OECD, Newsroom (Nov. 9, 2012)  
www.oecd.org/newsroom/balanceofeconomicpowerwillshiftdramaticallyoverthenext50yea
rssaysoecd.htm; OECD, Looking to 2060: Long-Term Global Growth Prospects, OECD 
Economic Policy Paper (Nov. 9, 2012). http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k8zxpjsggf0.pdf?expires=1383306469&id=id&accname
=guest&checksum=16E9C77FAEE9768FA31F7AE44DB78722. 
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and finance. In doing so, the research conducts six case studies, two 
in each sector. In trade, this article explores China’s strategic 
implementation of its WTO obligations within the automotive 
industry and the domestic cultural industry. In investment, this 
article analyzes China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policies 
on technology transfer and on its banking sector. Finally, in finance, 
this article considers China’s reforms of its foreign exchange regime 
and its observance of corresponding international obligations.         
 CHINA’S WTO COMMITMENTS AND DOMESTIC 
REFORMS UNDER THE TRADE REGIME 
After a fifteen-year negotiating marathon, China finally became a 
member of the WTO on 11 December 2001, a landmark event in the 
history of the multilateral trading system. China’s accession was 
significantly delayed by a confluence of events between 1989 and 
1999,2 and by opposition to accession from domestic interest groups 
and from governments in China and the West. 3  However, the 
enormous potential benefits of accession for China and the world 
always made China’s eventual WTO membership probable.  
Both the United States and the European Commission – the key 
parties who led the negotiations of China’s WTO admission – 
believed that a true World Trade Organization must have China as a 
member.4 They had high expectations that China’s WTO accession 
                                                
2 The major events included the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, the Uruguay Round negotiation from 1986 to 1994, and US 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. For reviews of China’s negotiation 
process, see Jeffrey L., Gertler, China’s WTO Accession – the Final Countdown, in CHINA 
AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 55-67 (Deborah Z. 
Cass et al. eds., 2003); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY, 63–65 (2002).  
3 See generally Yongzheng Yang, China’s WTO Accession: the Economics and Politics 34 
J. WORLD TRADE 77 (2000).  See also HUI FENG,THE POLITICS OF CHINA’S ACCESSION TO 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE DRAGON GOES GLOBAL 91–112 (2006) (discussing 
conflicting interests within the Chinese leadership); Joseph Fewsmith, China and the 
WTO: The Politics behind the Agreement 10 NAT’L BUREAU ASIAN RES. 23 (1999). 
4 See Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th 
Cong. 57 (1997) (statement of Carla A. Hills) (“It makes little sense to talk about a World 
Trade Organization in which a country with 20 percent of the world’s population, having 
an almost $1 trillion economy, and which is the world’s eleventh largest exporter, is not a 
member.”); Qingjiang Kong, China’s WTO Accession: Commitments and Implications, 3 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 655 at 665 (2000) (“The European Union claims to be ‘a consistent and 
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could bring significant economic benefits to their domestic 
stakeholders. 5 Then United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
Charlene Barshefsky stated: 
By opening the Chinese economy to U.S. goods, 
services and agricultural products, the WTO 
accession . . . will create significant new 
opportunities for American businesses, farmers and 
working people. . . . [W]e have won commercially 
meaningful and enforceable commitments that help 
Americans on the farm and on the job export to 
China by addressing the many layers of trade 
barriers and policies which limit access; strengthen 
guarantees of fair trade; and give us additional tools 
for enforcement and compliance.6  
Observers believed China’s accession would serve the United 
States’s economic interests by providing U.S. firms with greatly 
enhanced access to the world’s largest potential market in goods and 
services.7 It was also generally believed that China’s entry would 
allow the WTO’s wealthier nations to invoke the mechanism under 
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) and compel China to protect intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). 
China’s decision to seek WTO entry was driven by a host of 
factors, including enhanced market access to the 142 WTO 
Members, equality of treatment in key markets such as the US, 
including avoiding the humiliation of having to be the subject of an 
annual vote to confer upon China most favored nation status, further 
integration into the global economy and involvement in the 
formulation of global trading rules, and development of trade 
relationships with major trading partners.8 However, it has been 
                                                                                                           
vocal supporter of China’s entry into the WTO’. It ‘believes the WTO is not truly a 
‘‘World’’ Trade Organization without China.’”). 
5 See Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th 
Cong. 43 (2000) (statement of Charlene Barshefsky). 
6 Id. at 45–46. 
7 See LARDY, supra note 2, at 163–164; QINGJIANG KONG, CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 13 (2002). 
8  WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22398, THE JACKSON-VANIK 
AMENDMENT AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR WTO ACCESSION: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS., 2–
3 (2012); DILIP K. DAS, CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: ISSUES AND 
2013]   CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH GLOBAL REGIMES       5 
 
observed that the most important motivating factor was that WTO 
obligations could provide Chinese leadership with a powerful lever 
with which to facilitate and deepen the domestic economic and 
industrial reforms which China had been undertaking since the 
introduction of the “Reform and Open Door” policy by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1978.9 Long Yongtu, then China’s Vice-Minister of 
Trade and Chief WTO Negotiator, stated: 
The fact that China’s accession to an international 
organization would have such a wide impact 
throughout the world is something we had not 
expected at all. The important thing is that we in 
China have successfully and skillfully handled the 
domestic side of the accession process and have 
transformed the pressure generated by these 
negotiations, both at home and abroad, and turned 
them into a promoter, a catalyst for China’s historic 
process of economic reform and opening to the 
outside world – a process started by Deng Xiaoping 
23 years ago.10 
Jeffrey Gertler, then Secretary to the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, highlighted the benefits that China’s WTO 
membership would bring to its own economic reforms in these 
terms: 
Accession should allow China to lock in the 
accumulated benefits of the trade-reform process that 
the Chinese government has undertaken to date, and 
provide a platform from which China can sustain its 
reform process into the future. By placing China’s 
reforms within the broader context of trade 
liberalization by all WTO members, Chinese 
producers and exporters can increase the returns from 
trade reform in China through reciprocal market 
access abroad, and help the Chinese government 
                                                                                                           
IMPLICATIONS, DIGITAL COLLECTIONS, AVAILABLE AT 
HTTP://HDL.HANDLE.NET/1885/40255. 
9 See LARDY, supra note 2, at 29–36 (discussing China’s unilateral reforms before WTO 
accession). 
10 See YONGTU LONG, Negotiating Entry: Key Lessons Learned, CHINA IN THE WTO: THE 
BIRTH OF A NEW CATCHING-UP STRATEGY, 25, 26. (Carlos A. Magarinos et al. eds., 2002). 
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resist pressure domestically to reverse the process of 
reform.11 
Thus, the belief that WTO accession would significantly 
support China’s internal reforms was the principal reason for 
China’s eagerness to gain WTO membership. With these 
international obligations, the Chinese leadership secured substantial 
political leverage in the pursuit of reforms necessary for the 
continuous transition to a market economy, the transformation of 
inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and industries, the 
establishment of a system of rule of law, and the enhancement of 
transparency. These reforms were regarded as essential to enhancing 
the efficiency and competitiveness of SOEs and historically highly-
protected industries, and to “achieve the goal of efficient allocation 
of resources and an improved standard of living.”12 It was also 
hoped that the development of a system of rule of law and 
increasing transparency would serve to curtail rampant corruption, 
and promote security and predictability of legal rights for both 
domestic and foreign business operators.13 
China made unparalleled commitments in order to join the WTO. 
As Ambassador Barshefsky confirmed, the concessions China made 
“far exceeded what anyone would have expected.”14 For example, 
for goods, China committed to reduce its overall tariff level to 10% 
by 2008, with the average tariff for industrial goods reduced to 9.1% 
and for agricultural goods to 15.1%.15 Additionally, China agreed to 
open up sensitive service sectors such as telecommunications, 
banking, and insurance, and to grant essential rights to foreign firms, 
such as trading rights and distribution rights.16 The breadth and 
depth of China’s market opening is unprecedented, far exceeding 
                                                
11 Gertler, supra note 2, at 65. 
12 Ligang Song, The State of the Chinese Economy – Structural Changes, Impacts and 
Implications, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 83, 83–84 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003). 
13 Sylvia Ostry, WTO Membership for China: to be and not to be – is that the answer, in 
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 31, 35–36 
(Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003). 
14 Barshefsky, supra note 5, at 53; see also LARDY, supra note 2, at 65–105 (providing an 
overview of China’s commitments). 
15 GUANGSHENG SHI, Introduction: Working Together for a Brighter Future Based on 
Mutual Benefit,  CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, at 15, 15 (Henry Gao & Donald 
Lewis eds., 2005). 
16 See LARDY, supra note 2, at 66; Aaditya Mattoo, China’s Accession to the WTO: The 
Services Dimension, 6 J. INT’L ECON.L. 299, 300 (2003).  
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the concessions made by other developing countries and even most 
developed countries.17  
Furthermore, since accession, China has had an outstanding 
track record of implementing its commitments. To achieve 
compliance with various rules of the WTO, China amended or 
repealed “more than 3,000 laws and regulations at the central 
government level and 190,000 at the local government level, the 
largest-ever legislative revamp in history.”18 China “cut tariffs on 
over 5,000 products” and reduced the overall tariff level to 9.8%.19 
China granted market access to foreign services providers “even in 
the most sensitive sectors, such as telecommunications and 
insurance.”20 China also liberalized trading rights, which have long 
been controlled by the government, allowing all entities, including 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and foreign individuals, to 
import and export goods, except for a handful of special goods 
subject to state trading.21   
By admitting China to the WTO, the key players, especially the 
United States and the European Union, secured enormous 
commercial opportunities for their domestic stakeholders. 22 
However, China has not delivered all the benefits the rich nations 
wanted. Issues such as China’s enforcement of IPRs, restrictions on 
trading rights in selected areas, and protection of sensitive goods 
and services sectors have yet to be addressed to the satisfaction of 
western countries and their domestic stakeholders.23 China’s non-
                                                
17 See LARDY, supra note 2, at 79; Mattoo, supra note 16, at 333 (observing that China’s 
commitments in services are “the most radical services reform program negotiated in the 
WTO”). 
18 Xiaozhun Yi, A Decade in the WTO, A Decade of Shared Development, A DECADE IN 
THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade 
and Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 2011, at 1, 2 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz et al. 
eds., 2011).  
19 Zhenyu Sun, China’s Experience of 10 Years in the WTO, in A DECADE IN THE WTO: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and 
Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 2011, at 11, 11 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz et al. eds., 
2011).  
20 Id. at 12. 
21 See infra pp. 14-20 (discussing China’s liberalization of trading rights). 
22 See What Does China's WTO Accession Mean for Foreign Industry, U.S.-CHINA EXCH. 
ASS’N, http://www.usachina.org/english/chinamarket/cmg17.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 
2012) (detailing a brief account of benefits derived from China’s accession for foreign 
firms). 
23 See U.S. TRADE REP., 2011 USTR REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE, 
4–9 (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3189. 
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compliance with WTO rules in these specific areas has been caused 
in part by various difficulties China encountered in implementing its 
sweeping WTO commitments. 24  More significantly, however, 
China’s non-compliance reflects a strategic approach to 
implementation adopted so as to reap the full benefits of China’s 
WTO membership in foreign markets while simultaneously 
protecting the development of its key industries, and preserving its 
national values, culture and identity so that its opening up would 
serve its economic development. 25  Therefore, China has been 
moving very slowly towards its committed levels of liberalization or 
compliance in a range of specific areas, including bulk agricultural 
goods, certain sensitive industrial goods and services sectors, 
cultural goods, and enforcement of IPRs, to name a few.26 Below, 
we discuss China’s strategic implementation of its WTO 
commitments in the automotive industry and the cultural industry as 
examples of this phenomenon.  
 Protection of the Automotive Industry  
The automotive industry is one of the most sensitive industrial 
sectors in China. On one hand, the development of this industry has 
long been regarded as one of the key components and drivers of 
China’s economic reform and development, but on the other hand, 
this industry, which historically comprised groups of 
underdeveloped manufacturing and assembly sectors, had long 
remained vulnerable to foreign competition.27 Prior to China’s entry 
into the WTO, the auto industry was heavily protected by high 
tariffs, import quotas and other forms of non-tariff barriers.28 Upon 
accession, China committed to reduce its import tariff on cars from 
100% to 25%, and eliminate import quotas by 2005.29 Due to this 
                                                
24  See, e.g., Angela Gregory, Chinese Trademark Law and the TRIPs Agreement – 
Confucius Meets the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM 321, 327–32 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the internal 
impediments to China’s enforcement of intellectual property protection). 
25 See Long, supra note 10, at 35. 
26 See U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 23, at 23–112. 
27 See Eric Harwit, The Impact of WTO Membership on the Automobile Industry in China, 
167 CHINA Q. 655 (2001) (discussing the development of China’s auto industry before its 
WTO accession).  
28 Id. See also FEDERATION OF AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATIONS, WHAT HAS WTO 
MEMBERSHIP BROUGHT TO CHINA'S AUTO INDUSTRY?, available at 
http://www.fadaweb.com/wto.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2012). 
29 See Harwit, supra note 27, at 663.  
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massive dismantling of trade barriers, some feared that foreign auto 
products would flood into China’s market, creating overwhelming 
competition which Chinese auto producers would not be able to 
withstand. Close observers, however, have concluded that the 
impact of foreign competition on China’s auto industry has been 
moderate.30  
   It seems that China adroitly committed to liberalize its trade 
barriers to the point that it would still be able to sufficiently protect 
its automotive industry, so that foreign competition would drive the 
enhancement of efficiency and competitiveness of the industry 
without crippling it. During its decade of integration into the global 
trade regime, China’s auto industry has not only survived foreign 
competition but has made tremendous strides in capacity, efficiency, 
productivity, technological innovation, and development of local 
brands to the point that China has become one of the world’s 
leading auto producers.31 
   The support of the Chinese government has been 
indispensable to this rise in China’s automotive industry. One of the 
most important and widely recognized governmental supports has 
been the provision of super-national treatment to foreign companies 
investing in the automotive industry, which will be discussed later. 
Another form of support has been China’s strategic implementation 
of its WTO obligations on market access for foreign automobiles. 
Although China overhauled its border measures (i.e. import tariffs 
and quotas) in accordance with its WTO commitments, it introduced 
various forms of internal measures to restrict the impact of foreign 
competition in 2004 and 2005. One key measure was the Policy on 
Development of Automotive Industry 32  issued by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2004. Many 
provisions of this Policy had the effect of limiting the volume of 
imports, including limiting the number of ports of importation, 
prohibiting storage of imported autos at these ports if the imports 
are destined for domestic consumption, timing tariff collections so 
as to adversely affect the cash position and liquidity of importers, 
                                                
30 Id. at 665–669; LARDY, supra note 2, at 111–113.  
31  See RACHEL TANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40924, THE RISE OF CHINA’S AUTO 
INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE US MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 2–8 (Nov. 2009) 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40924.pdf. 
32 Policy on Development of Automotive Industry, Order No. 8 (promulgated by the Nat’l 
Dev. and Reform Comm’n (NDRC), effective May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Auto Policy]. 
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and restricting the number of distributors. 33  By enacting these 
measures, the Chinese government evidenced a clear preference for 
domestic automotive products over imports. Whether or not these 
specific provisions comply with WTO rules has not been tested.  
   The Policy, together with several implementing rules adopted in 
2005, stipulated that imported auto parts shall be treated as a 
complete vehicle if they are used in the production/assembly of a 
complete vehicle in China, and meet or exceed a specified quantity 
or value threshold.34 As mentioned above, China committed to bind 
its import tariffs on automobiles and auto parts at 25% and 10% 
respectively. These measures, therefore, had the effect of artificially 
inflating the import tariff on auto parts to the much higher level 
applicable to automobiles. In 2006, the European Union, the United 
States, and Canada challenged these Chinese measures, accusing 
China of violating its WTO commitments by subjecting imported 
auto parts to import tariffs in excess of its committed level.35 In 2008, 
the WTO found against China and recommended it make these 
measures consistent with its WTO commitments. On 31 August 
2009, China reported to the WTO that it had taken the necessary 
steps to remove the WTO-inconsistencies and comply with the 
tribunal’s recommendations.36  
   The approach taken by the Chinese government to protect its 
auto industry offers a perfect illustration of China’s strategic 
implementation of its WTO commitments.  While the WTO 
obligations serve as a much-needed external force with which to 
counteract domestic resistance to economic reforms, it is impossible 
                                                
33  See Henry Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 
SINGAPORE Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (2007) (discussing the effects of the aforementioned 
policy). 
34 See Measures for the Administration of Import Automobile Components and Parts 
Featuring Complete Vehicles, Decree No. 125, art. 21, 22 (promulgated by the General 
Administration of Customs (GAC), the NDRC, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the 
MOFCOM, Feb. 28, 2005, effective Apr. 1, 2005); Rules on Verification of Imported 
Automobile Parts Featuring Complete Vehicles, Announcement No. 4, art. 13, 14 
(promulgated by the GAC, Mar. 28, 2005, effective Apr. 1, 2005)(LexisNexis)(China). 
35 Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/R, 
WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R (Jan. 12, 2009); Appellate Body Report, WT/DS339/AB/R, 
WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (Jan. 12, 2009) (discussing the initial challenges and 
then going on to consider the appellate arguments). See Raj Bhala & Won-Mog Choi, 
China’s First Loss, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 321 (2011) (discussing this case). 
36 Minutes of Meeting of 31 Aug. 31, 2009, WT/DSB/M/273. 21 (Nov. 6, 2009)(WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body). 
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to foresee accurately all of the impacts of these market-opening 
obligations upon domestic industries. Therefore, when protection 
became economically and politically important for the auto industry, 
the Chinese government employed a strategic implementation 
approach in order to secure a safe environment for the development 
of this industry at the cost of foreign auto producers; and in defiance 
of its WTO commitments. Although the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism corrected China’s opportunistic approach, it took two 
years for western countries to become aware of China’s measures 
and another three years to eventually secure China’s compliance.  
During those five years, those internal measures that were not tested 
under the WTO continued to constitute obstacles to the importation 
of foreign autos, and hence protected a “healthy” competitive 
environment for domestic automotive producers. Furthermore, even 
though the Chinese government has amended or abolished those 
measures found to be WTO-illegal, it is likely that other forms of 
protectionist measures will be readily and easily introduced if and 
when necessary.             
 Restriction on Trading Rights for Cultural Goods  
For decades, trading rights – the right to import and export – 
were strictly controlled by the Chinese government. At the time of 
the launch of domestic reform in 1978, trading rights were 
dominated by 12 SOEs who were authorized to import and export 
all goods.37 The reform led to substantial liberalization of trading 
rights. Prior to WTO accession, the Chinese government had 
authorized 35,000 firms of all types to engage in foreign trade.38 
However, significant restrictions on trading rights still remained: 
China had an “examination and approval” system under which, in 
order to become a “foreign trade operator” (FTO) entitled to trading 
rights, applicants had to satisfy a number of criteria set forth in the 
then applicable Foreign Trade Law (1994)39 and the implementing 
regulations. These criteria mainly included threshold requirements 
for registered capital, export performance and prior experience, as 
                                                
37 See LARDY, supra note 2, at 40. 
38 Id. at 41–42. 
39 Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 8, 9 (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 12, 1994, effective Jul. 1, 1994, revised Apr. 6, 
2004, revision effective Jul. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Foreign Trade Law]. 
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well as limitations on the scope of imports and exports. 40 
Accordingly, the grant of trading rights was not automatic but was 
subject to the above-mentioned restrictions and the approval of the 
government. This “examination and approval” system for the grant 
of trading rights constituted a non-tariff barrier, with the effect of 
limiting the number and types of enterprises that could engage in 
importation, and consequently restricting the volume of imports.41 
   In order to join the WTO, China agreed to gradually 
liberalize trading rights within three years, so that after 11 
December 2004 there were to be no restrictions on who would be 
entitled to import and export goods, except for those goods for 
which China has retained the right of state trading.42 To implement 
this commitment China amended the 1994 Foreign Trade Law in 
July 2004. The revised Foreign Trade Law (2004) replaced the 
“examination and approval” system with a “registration” system 
under which all entities, domestic and foreign alike, were 
automatically granted trading rights upon registration.43 Registration 
was not dependent upon the satisfaction of the substantive criteria 
historically applicable under the “examination and approval” system 
but merely required the lodgment of documents containing basic 
information about the applicants such as business license and 
organization code. 44  Goods explicitly exempted from China’s 
commitment on trading rights are still subject to state trading.45 
However, for all other goods, it has been observed that the 
introduction of the registration system marks “a full liberalization of 
China’s general foreign trading rights regime as a WTO accession 
commitment.”46  
                                                
40 XIN ZHANG, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION IN CHINA: LAW AND POLICY 26–32 
(2006). 
41 Id., at 23–24.  
42 WTO Accession Working Party, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 
¶¶83(d) & 84(a), WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001); Protocol on the Accession of the 
People's Republic of China art. 5.1, Nov. 23, 2001, WT/L/432. (These exceptions, set out 
in Annex 2A of China’s Accession Protocol, include the importation of grain, vegetable oil, 
sugar, tobacco, crude oil, processed oil, chemical fertilizer, and cotton, and the exportation 
of tea, rice, corn, soy bean, tungsten ore and certain tungsten products, coal, crude oil, 
processed oil, silk, cotton, cotton yarn, certain woven cotton products, antimony, and 
silver). 
43 Foreign Trade Law, supra note 39, at arts. 3, 4. 
44 Id., art. 5.3.  
45 ZHANG, supra note 40, at 41–44. 
46 Id., at 31.  
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   This observation is generally correct, except that for years 
following WTO accession, the Chinese government, through a web 
of administrative regulations and departmental rules, maintained the 
“examination and approval” system and state trading in relation to 
the importation of some cultural goods including reading materials 
(i.e. books, newspapers, magazines, and electronic publications),47 
audio-visual products (i.e. videocassettes, video compact discs, and 
DVDs),48 and films for theatrical release.49 Although these goods are 
not contained in the list of goods exempted from China’s general 
commitment on trading rights, China confined the right to import 
these goods to approved or designated SOEs only. In 2007, the 
United States initiated a WTO proceeding – the China - 
Publications and Audio-Visual Products case,50 challenging Chinese 
measures restricting the right to import these cultural goods on the 
ground that FIEs, foreign enterprises and individuals had been 
deprived of trading rights which should have been granted 
according to China’s WTO commitments. In 2009, the WTO 
tribunals found in favor of the United States, ruling that China had 
breached its commitments on trading rights and urging China to 
bring the measures at issue into compliance with its commitments. 
Since then, China has taken steps to remedy its WTO violations. On 
12 March 2012, China reported to the WTO DSB that by amending 
or abolishing the relevant measures it has achieved consistency with 
its commitments. 51  However, given the economic and political 
                                                
47 Chubanwu Guanli Tiaoli (出版物管理条例) [Regulations on the Management of 
Publications] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002) 
(Westlaw China) at arts. 41, 42 (China). 
48  Yinxiang Zhipin Jinkou Guanli Banfa (音像制品进口管理办法 ) [Rules for the 
Management of the Import of Audiovisual Products] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Culture and the Gen. Admin. of Customs, Apr. 17, 2002, effective June 1, 2002) 
(LexisNexis) at arts. 7, 8 (China). 
49 Dianying Guanli Tiaoli (电影管理条例) [Regulations on the Management of Films] 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002) (LexisNexis) at 
arts. 5, 30(China). 
50 Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Jan. 19, 
2010); Appellate Body Report, WT/DS363/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2010). See also Tania Voon, 
China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 710 (2009) 
(providing an overview of this case). 
51 Status Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights And Distribution Services For 
Certain Publications And Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/17/Add. 14 
(Mar. 13, 2012). 
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significance of these cultural sectors in China, it is still too early to 
ascertain whether China has liberalized the trading rights in practice. 
It can be argued that the Chinese government has deliberately 
chosen not to liberalize the right to import these special goods 
regardless of the likely violations of its WTO obligations and is 
undertaking a strategic implementation of its WTO commitments. 
China’s non-compliance with commitments in this selected area 
suggests, at least, two policy considerations.  
First, it reflects the policy inclination of the Chinese 
government to maintain the protection of its domestic cultural 
industry from foreign competition. The Chinese government has 
treated the reform and development of the cultural industry as being 
one of its policy priorities and accordingly has devoted a great 
amount of resources to achieving that goal.52 Although this industry 
has been reformed in recent years, it faces a range of problems and 
remains underdeveloped and considerably less competitive than that 
of developed countries.53 Therefore, although ambitiously promoting 
reforms and development of the industry, the Chinese government 
has believed that a transitional period is essential to allow the 
industry to gain efficiency and competitiveness in the global cultural 
market.54 One traditional way of affording protection to this industry 
is to confine the right to import cultural goods to a very limited 
number of SOEs designated by the General Administration of Press 
and Publications (GAPP) for reading materials and by the State 
Administration on Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) for films. 
Quantities of imports have thereby been strictly controlled so as to 
prevent the industrial reform and development being frustrated by a 
flood of highly competitive foreign cultural imports. As pointed out 
                                                
52 See Xiaolu Chen, China’s Cultural Industries in the Face of Trade Liberalization: An 
Analytical Framework of China’s Cultural Policy 68–86 (2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
The Ohio State University) available at 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap:10:0::NO:10:P10_ETD_SUBID:69733 (follow “View” or 
“Download” hyperlinks) (discussing comprehensively the evolution of China’s policies on 
cultural development and reforms). See generally Xiang Yong & Yu Wenyi, Chinese 
Cultural Industries: Targets, Gross Volume, Structure, Problems and Strategy, 19 INT’L J. 
HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 152 (2011). 
53  See WTO & Chinese Culture: Rising WTO Challenges to Culture Industry, 
CHINACULTURE.ORG, http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_focus/2003-
09/25/content_43085.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). 
54 See Chen, supra note 52, at 48–67 (discussing a “cultural exception and cultural 
ambition” approach adopted by the Chinese government in fostering development of its 
cultural industry). 
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by Long Yongtu, China had aimed to ensure its WTO commitments 
reflect “the level of maturity reached in each and every sector under 
negotiation” so that “these arrangements will not jeopardize the 
development of these industries.”55 Apparently, while the Chinese 
government did not manage to negotiate an exception to the general 
obligation to liberalize trading rights for its sensitive cultural sectors, 
it strategically ignored its WTO commitments in these sectors.  
Second, apart from the economic considerations discussed above, 
China’s strategic implementation reflects a mix of cultural and 
political considerations of the specific nature of cultural goods that 
carry the content of social values and political orientation. Each 
society has unique values, but China considers its cultural heritage 
to be particularly rich and exceptional, and has put a high priority on 
preserving its national values, culture, and identity. Thus, while 
supporting China’s bid for the WTO membership, then Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin stressed that: 
[A] few countries . . . have tried to force their own 
values, economic regime, and social system on other 
countries by taking advantage of economic 
globalization . . . we must take it as a crucial task in 
our cultural development to carry forward and 
cultivate the national spirit and incorporate it into our 
national education and the entire process of building 
spiritual civilization . . . 56 
Furthermore, cultural goods “serve as essential instruments in 
disseminating government policy and shaping public opinion.”57 
China’s imposition of the limitations on the right to import cultural 
goods has therefore been considered important to (1) “combat 
perceived cultural colonialism” by western countries, especially the 
US, and (2) “regulate the cultural content its population 
consumes.”58 Accordingly, in the China - Publications and Audio-
                                                
55 Long, supra note 10, at 32. 
56 Chen, supra note 52, at 58–59 citing Jiang Zemin speech at Grand Gathering Marking 
the Eightieth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, PEOPLE’S DAILY, July 2, 2001, 
at 3-4. 
57  Jingxia Shi & Weidong Chen, The ‘Specificity’ of Cultural Products versus the 
‘Generality’ of Trade Obligations: Reflecting on ‘China – Publications and Audiovisual 
Products,’ 45 J. WORLD TRADE 159, 161 (2011). 
58 Elanor A. Mangin, Market Access in China – Publications and Audiovisual Materials: A 
Moral Victory with A Silver Lining, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 279, 302–303 (2010). 
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Visual Products litigation, China argued vigorously that the trading 
rights limitations in these cultural sectors have played an essential 
role in protecting public morals by ensuring that the content of 
imports is reviewed by competent import entities and does not 
contravene the social norms and values in China.59 Although China 
lost the argument that restricting trading rights is a WTO-consistent 
way of protecting public morals, its prerogative to regulate the 
content of cultural imports was not questioned by the WTO 
tribunals. Therefore, China will almost certainly maintain 
censorship through other measures untested under the WTO, which 
may well constitute new forms of strategic implementation in the 
cultural industry.  
In short, in restricting trading rights in the cultural sectors, the 
Chinese government restricts not only the quantity, but also the 
quality, of imports. Based on a mix of economic, political, social 
and cultural considerations, China has chosen to conduct a strategic 
implementation of its obligations whereby it denies market access to 
foreign cultural goods for the purpose of the reform and 
development of its own cultural industry.   
 CHINA’S WTO COMMITMENTS AND DOMESTIC 
REFORMS UNDER THE INVESTMENT REGIME 
Another pillar of China’s economic reform has been the 
liberalization of its foreign investment regime. As a result of the 
liberalization, China has received steadily increasing foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows,60 and in the first half of 2012 it surpassed 
the United States to become the largest recipient of FDI 
worldwide. 61  Many factors have underpinned the FDI boom in 
China, such as China’s market potential and cheap labor, but 
perhaps the most influential factor has been China’s opening up to, 
                                                
59 See China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, supra note 50, ¶ 7.713. 
60  Xinkui Wang, WTO Accession: A Historical Opportunity for China’s Reform and 
Opening, in A DECADE IN THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE 
GOVERNANCE 61 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz et al. eds., 2011) (detailing the rise of export 
oriented FDI in China since 1986). 
61 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Global Investment Trends 
Monitor, No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/2 (Oct. 23, 2012). 
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and especially its provision for preferential treatment of, foreign 
investment.62 The liberalization process can be divided into two 
major stages – the first being China’s unilateral opening up to 
foreign investment before joining the WTO and the second being 
China’s opening up according to its WTO obligations. We begin 
with an overview of the two stages of liberalization, followed by a 
discussion of how China has gained enormously from the 
liberalization of its investment regime and by aligning its policies 
and laws governing foreign investment tightly with its national 
development goals. 
The launch of the “reform and open door” policy was a 
watershed in the history of China’s foreign investment regime.63 In 
July 1979, the Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures64 (SFEJV Law) was enacted to allow foreign investors to 
establish equity joint ventures (JVs) with Chinese enterprises. 
Besides laying down the basic legal framework for FDI, the Law 
specified some tax incentives for foreign investors and for JVs with 
leading technology.65 Subsequently, in 1986 and 1988 respectively, 
the Law of the PRC on Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprises66 (FWOE 
Law) and the Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Contractual 
Cooperative Enterprises 67  (SFCCE Law) were enacted to allow 
other forms of foreign investment. Several implementing 
regulations68 were also put into effect to provide greater details on 
                                                
62 See Wanda Tseng & Harm Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some Lessons 
for Other Countries, IMF POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER, Feb. 2002, at 8–19. (showing the 
three primary factors that have influenced FDI growth in China). 
63 See Tseng & Zebregs, supra note 62, at 11–17; K.C. Fung et al., Foreign Direct 
Investment in China: Policy, Recent Trend and Impact 33 GLOBAL ECON. REV. 99, 99–105 
(2004)(Apart from the references to specific Chinese laws and regulations, the following 
description is based on these two sources) 
64 Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., effective July 8, 1979; amended by the Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Apr. 
4, 1990; amended by the Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Mar. 15, 2001) [hereinafter 
SFEJV Law].  
65 See SFEJV Law (1979), supra note 64, at art. 8. 
66 Law of the PRC on Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprises (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., effective Apr. 12, 1986; amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., effective Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter FWOE Law]. 
67 Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Contractual Cooperative Enterprises (promulgated by 
the Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Apr. 13, 1988; amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., effective Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter SFCCE Law]. 
68 Regulations for the Implementation of Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures, Decree No. 311 (promulgated by the St. Council on Sep 20, 1983; amended by 
the St. Council on Jan. 15, 1986, then on Dec. 21, 1987, and most recently on July 22, 
18 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    Vol. 9 
 
the formation and operation of these enterprises and implement 
other policies in favor of FDI. These policies involved an array of 
tax and non-tax incentives in designated regions of China, starting 
with five pilot Special Economic Zones (SEZ)69 and fourteen Open 
Coastal Cities (OCC)70 and then expanding to other areas nationwide.  
The special tax incentives mainly consisted of income tax 
exemptions and reductions for a specified period of time, 
“exemptions of customs duties and the value-added tax for imported 
equipment and technology . . . full refunds for income tax paid on 
reinvested earnings, and no restrictions on profit remittances and 
capital repatriation.”71 Other non-tax incentives mainly pertained to 
the relaxation of government controls on the movements of goods, 
export and import, and the use of land, water and other resources 
and infrastructure. In order to regulate the direction of FDI, the 
Chinese government issued rules in 1995, classifying FDI projects 
into four categories: Encouraged, Permitted, Restricted, and 
Prohibited. 72  While various restrictions were placed on foreign 
investment in the “restricted” and “prohibited” sectors (such as 
upper limits on foreign ownership shares and sectorial restrictions 
on foreign investment), particularly favorable tax and non-tax 
incentives were accorded to foreign investment in the “encouraged” 
sectors, especially to export-oriented FIEs and those employing new 
                                                                                                           
2001, effective July 22, 2001) [hereinafter SFEJV Regulation]; Regulations for the 
Implementation of Law of the PRC on Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprises, Decree No. 
301 (approved by the St. Council on Oct. 28, 1990; revised on Apr. 12, 2001, effective Apr. 
12, 2001) [hereinafter FWOE Regulation]; Regulations for the Implementation of Law of 
the PRC on Sino-Foreign Contractual Cooperative Enterprises (approved by the State 
Council and promulgated by the MOFTEC on Aug. 7, 1995, effective Aug. 7, 1995) 
[hereinafter SFCCE Regulation].  
69 The 5 SEZs include Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai in Guangdong province, Xiamen in 
Fujian province and Hainan province. 
70  The 14 OCCs are Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, 
Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai City. 
71 Tseng & Zebregs, supra note 62, at 15. 
72 The Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Projects was approved by the 
State Council on 7 June 1995, effective 20 June 1995. This interim rule was replaced by 
the Regulations Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment, Decree No. 346 
(promulgated by the State Council Feb. 11, 2002, effective Apr. 1, 2002). Catalogue of 
Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (Catalogue), order No. 5 (promulgated by the 
State Planning Commission (SPC), State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and 
the MOFTEC, effective on June 20, 1995). This Catalogue has been revised several times 
in 1997 (by Order No. 9 of the SPC, the SETC and the MOFTEC), in 2002 (by Order No. 
21 of the SPC, the SETC and the MOFTEC), in 2004 (by Order No. 24 of the NDRC and 
the MOFCOM), in 2007 (by Order No. 57 of the NDRC and the MOFCOM), and lately in 
2011 (by Order No. 12 of the NDRC and the MOFCOM).  
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and advanced technology. These policies and laws encouraging 
technology FIEs will be discussed further below. Furthermore, the 
Chinese government imposed many restrictions on FIEs in general, 
most notably local content requirements under which FIEs were 
required to purchase raw materials and components from domestic 
suppliers, and export performance and foreign exchange balancing 
requirements under which the amount of imports allowed by FIEs 
was conditioned upon their volume of exports and amount of 
foreign exchange earnings respectively.73 
In order to join the WTO, China further liberalized its foreign 
investment regime in a number of ways.74 First, China revised the 
Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (Catalogue), 
increasing the number of “encouraged” sectors for foreign 
investment from 186 to 262, and decreasing the number of 
“restricted” sectors from 112 to 75. Second, the restrictions on 
foreign equity were relaxed and the performance requirements, 
including local content, export performance and foreign exchange 
balancing, were removed pursuant to the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). Third, under its 
specific commitments attached to the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), China pledged to gradually open up its 
sensitive service sectors to foreign participation, such as 
telecommunications, banking, and distribution. China’s FDI policies 
in the banking sector will be further discussed below. 
   China’s liberalization of its foreign investment regime has 
provided great commercial opportunities for foreign investors.75 
Having benefited from China’s unilateral opening-up, rich countries 
had high expectations that bringing China into the WTO would 
bring considerably more opportunities for their companies. In large 
measure, these expectations have been fulfilled.   
                                                
73 See, e.g., SFEJV Law (1990), supra note 64, at art. 9; SFEJV Regulation (1987), supra 
note 68, at arts. 4(3), 14(7), 57 & 75; FWOE Law (1986), supra note 66, at arts. 3, 15 & 18; 
FWOE Regulation (1990), supra note 68, at arts. 3(2), 15, 45 & 46. 
74  See generally Julia Ya Qin, Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO 
Accession on China’s Legal System, 191 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 720, 728–733 (2007) 
(China’s WTO accession liberalized China’s economy, resulting in huge growth in trade 
and investment); Fung et al., supra note 63, at 104–105. 
75  See generally U.N.CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: 
TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES, U.N. Sales No. E.12.ll.D.3 (2012) 
(estimating that China is likely to be the most attractive destination for FDI in the 
following three years until 2014). 
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However, it is submitted that China’s gains eclipse those of its 
foreign investors.  China has continuously liberalized its market for 
foreign investment, and yet has regulated FDI in such a way as to 
ensure that it contributes to China’s economic reform and 
development without retarding the growth of its underdeveloped 
industries.76 For decades, foreign investment has been an essential 
driving force for China’s economic growth and transformation. 
Specifically, FDI has made tremendous contributions to the 
economic development of China by expanding the export of 
manufacturing goods, imparting new and advanced technology and 
management skills, enhancing industrial productivity and the 
competitiveness of Chinese goods and services, raising capital 
formation and accumulation, creating job opportunities, generating 
tax revenue, stimulating China’s transition to a market-oriented 
economy and raising the living standards of its people. 77  The 
investment policies and laws adopted and implemented by the 
Chinese government in both stages of the liberalization – the 
unilateral opening-up stage and the WTO-mandated opening-up 
stage – have played an essential role in helping China to achieve 
such great success. Two typical examples will be discussed below: 
China’s encouragement of high-tech FIEs, and its selected 
liberalization of its banking sector.  
 China’s FDI Policy on Technology Transfer  
Since the commencement of its reform, the Chinese 
government anticipated that FDI “would introduce new technologies, 
know-how and capital”,78 and committed itself to promoting FDI 
that facilitates transfer of technology to local firms. As established 
empirically, the diffusion of new and advanced technology, 
                                                
76 See David A. Eberle, FDI in China: Economic Growth and Policy 5–6 (EE469 Seminar 
in Dev. Econ., Working Paper), available at 
http://www.davideberle.com/files/university/SeminarDevelopmentEconomics%20FDIChin
a.pdf (arguing that most of these negative impacts associated with FDI boom, as many 
observers have predicted, have been wisely managed by the Chinese government to ensure 
that those impacts will not affect the reform and development of domestic industries). 
77 See Kevin H. Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in China: A 
Panel Data Study for 1992-2004 (June 25, 2006), at 4-5, 
http://www.karyiuwong.com/confer/beijing06/papers/zhang.pdf; Long, supra note 10, at 
28–34; Fung et al., supra note 63, at 117–123; Lee G. Branstetter & Nicholas Lardy, 
China’s Embrace of Globalization 17–20 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Dep’t. of Soc. and 
Decision Sciences, Working Paper No. 49, 2006). 
78 Tseng & Zebregs, supra note 62, at 11.  
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expertise and knowledge has been one of the most significant 
benefits that FDI has generated for China’s economic growth.79 The 
productivity and technological capability of China’s industries have 
improved dramatically, at a pace much faster than many other 
developing countries.80   
   The Chinese government’s strategy to use FDI as a vehicle 
for foreign technology transfer has been indispensable for the 
extraordinary technological development of China. In almost all 
FDI-related laws and regulations, foreign investment that led to the 
introduction of new and advanced technologies has been warmly 
welcomed and consistently promoted through a variety of 
preferential treatments. In each version of the SFEJV Law, the 
FWOE Law and the SFCCE Law as well as their corresponding 
implementing regulations, the use of new and advanced 
technologies was one of the most important requirements imposed 
on FIEs.81 Under each version of the Catalogue, foreign investment 
that fostered technological advancement and innovation in various 
sectors was consistently classified as ‘encouraged’. More 
specifically, as mentioned above, technologically-advanced FIEs 
were eligible for income tax exemptions and reductions on more 
favorable terms than those applied generally to most of the other 
FIEs.  
During the initial stage of opening-up in the 1980s, while all FIEs 
were entitled to income tax holidays for the first two years and fifty 
percent tax reduction in the following three years, technology FIEs 
were granted an extension of the fifty percent tax reduction for 
another three years.82 In SEZs, the income tax rate applicable to 
technology FIEs (i.e. ten percent) was lower than that on most other 
FIEs (i.e. fifteen percent).83 Likewise, since the 1990s, the FIEs 
established in designated zones that contributed to technological 
                                                
79 See Zhiqiang Liu, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Spillover: Evidence from 
China, 30 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 579 (2002); Xinglong Xie & Hongqi Wang, On Effects 
of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth, 2 INT’L BUS. RESEARCH 100 (2009). 
80 INNOVATION AND GROWTH: CHASING A MOVING FRONTIER 41–43 (Vandana Chandra et al. 
eds., 2009). 
81 See e.g., SFEJV Law (1979, 2001), supra note 64, at art. 5; SFEJV Regulations (1983), 
supra note 68, at art. 4(1); SFEJV Regulations (2001), supra note 68, at art. 3; FWOE Law 
(1986, 2000), supra note 66, at art. 3; FWOE Regulations (1990, 2001), supra note 68, at 
art. 3; SFCCE Law (2000), supra note 67, at art. 4. 
82 Tseng & Zebregs, supra note 62, at 15. 
83 Id. 
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progress enjoyed much lower income tax rates (i.e. fifteen percent 
versus thirty-three percent), additional periods of tax exemption and 
reduction, and a full tax refund upon direct reinvestment, amongst 
other benefits not received by other FIEs.84 Moreover, as foreign 
investment in the form of JVs began to be regarded as a better 
vehicle for the transfer of technology to domestic firms,85 equity JVs 
began to be granted more favorable tax treatment than foreign 
wholly owned enterprises.86  
In the auto industry, Sino-foreign JVs were the only permitted 
form of FDI primarily because these could most effectively help 
domestic firms acquire foreign technology. 87  To ensure such 
acquisitions of technology, the establishment of auto JVs was 
conditioned upon foreign investors transferring technology to their 
Chinese partners.88 In the meantime, FDI in the auto sector was 
encouraged not only by these tax incentives but also by other 
financial incentives (such as preferential access to bank credit and 
loans).89  
In 2007, China enacted the Enterprise Income Tax Law90 (EIT 
Law), which came into effect on 1 January 2008. This law, which 
was formulated partly in response to growing domestic opposition 
to the super-national treatment of FIEs, considerably reduced these 
FDI-related tax incentives and unified the tax rates and policies for 
FIEs and domestic enterprises.91 While a twenty-five percent income 
tax is now being applied across the board, tax incentives for 
technology progress have been reinforced rather than reduced. For 
                                                
84 Qun Li, Tax Incentive Policies for Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China and their 
Influence on Foreign Investment, 18 REVENUE L. J., 2008, at 1, 8-13. 
85 Sanjaya Lall & Manuel Albaladejo, The Competitive Impact of China on Manufactured 
Exports by Emerging Economies in Asia, CHINA IN THE WTO: THE BIRTH OF A NEW 
CATCHING-UP STRATEGY 76, 101–102 (Carlos A. Magarinos et al. eds., 2002). 
86 See Li, supra note 84, at 4. 
87 See GREGORY T. CHIN, CHINA’S AUTOMOTIVE MODERNIZATION: THE PARTY-STATE AND 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 114–115 (Palgrave Macmillan 2010). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 112. 
90  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui (中华⼈人民共和国企业所得税法) 
[Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 
2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) 63 Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China. 
[hereinafter EIT Law]. (This law is implemented by Regulations for the Implementation of 
Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC, Decree No. 512 (promulgated by the State 
Council on Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) [hereinafter EIT Regulations].)  
91 See supra note 84, at 24–36. 
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instance, income earned from technology transfers is eligible for a 
fifty percent tax reduction or tax exemption.92 Enterprises with “high 
and new technology” enjoy a reduced tax rate of fifteen percent 
provided they satisfy certain specified criteria including, inter alia, 
ownership of core IPRs and sufficient devotion to technological 
development.93 Enterprises investing in unlisted medium and small 
high-technology enterprises are entitled to tax deductions for 
seventy percent of their total investment.94 The continuing provision 
of preferential tax treatment for technology enterprises is a corollary 
of the policy direction of FDI towards technological development. 
Both the eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-2010) and the twelfth Five 
Year Plan (2011-2015) have strengthened the role of technological 
innovation and advancement in bolstering further economic growth 
and reform in China.95 With respect to foreign investment, the focus 
has been shifted from the quantity of FDI to the quality of FDI, with 
a particular emphasis on encouraging and directing foreign 
investment in high-tech industries. Therefore, it is hardly surprising 
that the Chinese government has maintained the preferential 
treatment of technology FIEs while leveling the playing field for 
domestic and foreign-invested enterprises in most other areas.  
   Before China’s entry into WTO, its foreign investment 
policies mandating technology transfer aroused considerable 
concerns among foreign investors and their governments. Upon 
WTO accession, China committed not to condition the approval of 
foreign investment upon “the transfer of technology . . . or the 
conduct of research and development in China.”96 However, it has 
been noted that many Chinese laws and regulations remain geared 
toward encouraging technology transfer and research and 
development (R&D) by FIEs.97 For example, Several Opinions on 
                                                
92 See EIT Law, supra note 90, art. 27(4); EIT Regulations, supra note 90, art. 90. 
93 See supra note 90, art. 28(2); EIT Regulations, supra note 90, art. 93. 
94 EIT Law, supra note 90, art. 31; EIT Regulations, supra note 90, art. 97. 
95 THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC, OUTLINE OF THE 11TH FIVE-YEAR 
PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841.htm; OUTLINE OF THE 12TH FIVE-YEAR 
PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm. 
96 See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 42, art. 7.3. 
97 See United States Trade Representative, supra note 23, at 68; Amanda McBratney, Post-
WTO China: Competition and Technology Transfer Laws in the ‘New’ Socialist Market 
Economy, 12 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 1 (2004) (reviewing Chinese laws relevant to technology 
transfer). 
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Further Improving the Work of Utilizing Foreign Investment 
explicitly directs FDI into high-tech industries and FIEs to engage 
in R&D activities.98 Even in areas where such policy direction is 
absent, technology transfer has still been treated as necessary for 
FDI approvals in practice by some Chinese authorities.99 
Although the WTO-consistency of these laws and practice has 
not been tested, they appear incompatible with China’s obligations 
to remove these requirements relating to technology transfer and 
R&D in approving FDI. However, given China’s long-standing and 
consistent commitment to economic reform and development 
through technological advancement and innovation, it is reasonable 
to believe that China will continue to flout its obligations under the 
WTO and utilize FDI to advance the technological progress of 
domestic industries. Undertakings relating to technology transfer 
and development, in one way or another, are likely to remain the 
price foreign investors will have to pay for market access.  
Finally, as mentioned before, the developed world widely 
expected that China’s WTO admission, with its obligations under 
TRIPs, would lead to China’s enforcement of IPRs in favor of 
foreign investors. However, from China’s perspective, the primary 
motivation for undertaking the TRIPs obligations was that IPR 
protection is indispensible for attracting high-tech FDI and fostering 
indigenous technological innovation. As Long Yongtu stated,  
China has to create a favourable environment at home 
to provide enough incentives for its own people to 
advance scientific and technology innovation, which 
is crucial to China’s future status in international 
competition. The conclusion is that the protection of 
IPRs is not a favour for the foreigners; it is in the 
fundamental interest of China itself. 
In this connection, protection of IPRs has become a 
precondition for China to attract more FDI, especially 
in the high-tech area, as the preferential treatment 
                                                
98 Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyuby Zuo Hao Liyong Waizi GongZuo de RuoGan Yijian (国
院关于 一步做好利用外 工作的若干意 ) [Several Opinions of the State Council on 
Further Utilizing Foreign Capital] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 6, 2010, effective 
Apr. 13, 2010). 
99 See United States Trade Representative, supra note 23, at 68. 
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provided in taxation and other incentives is not 
sufficient to maintain China’s appeal to foreign 
investors.100 
In summary, as with the liberalization of its foreign trade regime, 
China’s liberalization of its foreign investment regime has served its 
own national interest. While ambitiously promoting foreign 
investment, China adhered to its development goals and 
endeavoured to regulate FDI in ways that contribute to its economic 
growth and reform. China strategically ‘implemented’ its 
international obligations to utilize high-tech FDI to develop the 
technological capacity of its domestic industries. When WTO 
obligations stood in the way of China’s accomplishment of its 
policy goals (such as technological development through high-tech 
FDI), China deliberately ignored those obligations in pursuit of its 
domestic interests at the expense of foreign investors. This point can 
also be demonstrated by a brief discussion of China’s liberalization 
of its banking sector for foreign investment. 
 China’s FDI Policies in the Banking Sector 
Before WTO accession, and despite its general policy of 
attracting FDI, China maintained severe restrictions on foreign 
investment in a number of highly sensitive services sectors such as 
telecommunications, financial services and distribution services.101 
In admitting China into the WTO, western countries managed to 
have China commit to gradually open up these sectors to foreign 
participation.102 However, China’s implementation of these WTO 
commitments has progressed significantly more slowly than in other 
areas, generating considerable concern. 
One of the most protected and slow-developing services sectors 
in China has been the banking industry. During the period of 
unilateral liberalization, banking services were dominated by four 
state-owned commercial banks – namely Bank of China (BOC), 
China Construction Bank, China Agricultural Bank and China 
Industrial and Commercial Bank – and the sector was almost 
                                                
100 Yongtu Long, Implications of China’s Entry into the WTO in the Field of Intellectual 
Property Rights, in CHINA IN THE WTO: THE BIRTH OF A NEW CATCHING-UP STRATEGY 
165, 168–169 (Carlos A. Magarinos et al. eds., Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. 2002). 
101 See generally LARDY, supra note 2, at 66–73. 
102 See generally Mattoo, supra note 16. 
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entirely closed to foreign banks.103 Foreign investment was subject 
to geographical restrictions, limited scope of business, and other 
entry barriers. In general, foreign banks were only allowed to 
provide foreign currency banking services. Although an increasing 
number of foreign banks were permitted to conduct RMB currency 
business from 1997, they were allowed to do so only in Pudong and 
Shenzhen and only to FIEs located in these two regions.104 The 
capacity of foreign banks to conduct RMB business was further 
restricted by limitations on their access to domestic currency, 
including domestic currency deposit ceilings and conditions that 
tied domestic currency deposits to foreign currency deposits.105 
Upon WTO accession, China pledged to progressively 
liberalize its banking sector for foreign suppliers by phasing out the 
above-mentioned restrictions by December 2006.106 As specified in 
its GATS Schedule, China’s major commitments relating to foreign 
investment in the banking sector include:  
 allowing FDI in the banking sector by either establishing 
wholly foreign-owned banks or permitting investment in 
Chinese banks without placing limitations on foreign ownership 
or forms of foreign investment; 
 gradually relaxing and eventually removing the limitations on 
the location, client groups and scope of business of foreign 
banks, such that upon the expiration of the phase-out period, 
foreign banks will be allowed to engage in domestic currency 
                                                
103 See Wenyan Yang, Domestic Banking under Financial Liberalization: Lessons for 
China as a Member of the WTO, in CHINA’S ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION THROUGH THE 
WTO 35, 36 (Ding Lu et al. eds., 2003).  
104 See LARDY, supra note 2, at 68–70. 
105 Id. at 69–70. 
106  See generally CHING CHEONG &CHING HUNG YEE, HANDBOOK ON CHINA’S WTO 
ACCESSION AND ITS IMPACTS 265-267 (World Scientific Publ’g Co. Pte. Ltd. 2003) 
(outlining China’s commitments to open banking services); Huang, An Analysis of 
Performance Conditions in China’s Banking Service Market and Competitive Situation 
and Development Strategies of Foreign Banks in the Wake of China’s WTO Accession, in 
CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 201, 201-25 (Henry Gao & Donald Lewis eds., 2005) 
(Parenthetical Expalantion); Daniel C. Crosby, Banking on China’s WTO Commitments: 
‘Same Bed, Different Dreams’ in China’s Financial Services Sector, 11 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 
75, 91-96 (2007) (overview of China’s banking sector reforms). 
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business in all regions and to all Chinese clients;107 
 other than prudential measures, lifting all existing restrictions 
on the “ownership, operation, and juridical form of foreign 
financial institutions”; and 
 according national treatment to foreign banks so that they are 
entitled to terms or conditions at least as favorable as those 
applied to domestic banks.108 
 China’s commitments to opening up the banking sector are more 
thorough and comprehensive than any those made by other WTO 
Members. However, China’s progress and overall implementation 
of these commitments have considerably lagged behind the 
expectations of foreign governments and investors, and indeed 
behind what the Chinese government has regularly asserted. 
Certainly, as in other sectors, the Chinese government has long 
planned to undertake reforms of its banking sector so as to enhance 
its efficiency and competitiveness. However, the particular 
sensitivity of the banking sector coupled with the long-standing 
state dominance of banking has significantly impeded the reform 
process. Thus, even though the Chinese government has realized 
that its banking system has constituted one of the largest 
impediments to China’s further economic growth109, the political 
will has been inadequate to accelerate the pace of reforms. 
Consequently, despite the growing presence of foreign banks and 
branches of foreign banks in the Chinese market after China’s WTO 
accession, they have failed to gain more than a marginal share in 
China’s banking system.110  
The limited foreign penetration into China’s banking sector has 
much to do with the Chinese government’s measures governing FDI 
in this sector. For instance, in December 2003, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) promulgated the Administrative 
Rules Governing the Equity Investment in Chinese Financial 
Institutions by Overseas Financial Institutions, which confines the 
                                                
107 The only conditions pertain to certain minimum asset requirement and operational 
requirements that foreign banks need to have had three years’ business operation in China 
and been profitable for two consecutive years prior to the application. 
108 The only exception is the minimum asset requirement mentioned in note 107 . 
109  VIOLAINE COUSIN, BANKING IN CHINA 10-12 (2d ed. 2011). 
110 Id. at 6–7. 
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equity share of a single foreign investor in a Chinese bank to 20% 
and the total equity share of foreign investors to 25%.111  This 
requirement, which restricts foreign ownership in Sino-foreign joint 
banks, is arguably in conflict with China’s GATS commitments as 
listed above.112 In November 2006, the State Council issued the 
Regulations for the Administration of Foreign-Funded Banks, 113 
which was implemented by the CBRC’s Rules for the 
Implementation of the Regulations for the Administration of 
Foreign-Funded Banks.114 Amongst other conditions, these measures 
stipulate that foreign banks’ branches can only take RMB deposits 
of one million or more from Chinese citizens, and that in order to 
conduct RMB business, these branches must have a working capital 
of RMB 100 million.115 These conditions, which are not specified in 
China’s GATS schedule, have effectively restricted the capacity of 
foreign bank branches to engage in RMB business, and therefore 
may also constitute a violation of China’s WTO obligations.116  
Finally, in a recent WTO case, the United States challenged a 
range of Chinese measures that established a state monopoly in the 
provision of electronic payment services (EPS) for RMB payment 
                                                
111  Jingwai Jinrong Jigou Touzi Rugu Zhongzi Jinrong Jigou Guanli Banfa 
(境外金融机构投资入股中资金融机构管理办法) [Administrative Rules Governing the 
Equity Investment in Chinese Financial Institutions by Overseas Financial Institutions] 
(promulgated by China Banking Regulatory Commission., Dec. 8, 2003, effective Dec. 31, 
2003 ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Dec. 8, 2003 (China). 
112 See Crosby, supra note 106 at 91-96 (exploring whether China’s GATS commitments 
provide rights for qualified foreign financial institutions to acquire interests in existing 
Chinese banks). 
113 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghuoguo Waizi Yinhang Guanli Tiaoli Shishi Xize (中 人民共
和国外 行管理条例 施 )[Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
Administration of Foreign-funded Banks]( promulgated by China Banking Regulatory 
Commission., Nov 24, 2006, effective Dec. 11, 2006) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Nov 24, 
2006.(China) 
114 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Administration of Foreign-funded Banks (promulgated by the China Banking 
Regulatory Comm’n, Nov. 24, 2006, effective Dec.11, 2006) 
http://fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_3775_0_7.html (China) [hereinafter Implementation 
Rules for the Regulations on Administration of Foreign-invested Banks]. 
115 Regulations on Administration of Foreign-funded Banks, supra note 113, art. 31; 
Implementation Rules for the Regulations on Administration of Foreign-invested Banks, 
supra note 114, art. 50. 
116 See Crosby, supra note 106, at 97-101 (detailing the tension between China’s WTO 
obligations and the regulatory needs of China’s financial services market). 
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card transactions.117 As the United States claimed, these measures 
essentially required all EPS to be provided by a sole supplier – the 
China Union Pay, Co. Ltd. (CUP), which was founded under the 
approval of the State Council and the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
in 2002. The panel found that: (1) in its GATS schedule, China had 
assumed the responsibility to grant all foreign financial institutions 
the access to conducting RMB business without any limitations 
other than prudential measures; (2) the EPS business in concern is a 
type of RMB business; (3) China has failed to allow EPS suppliers 
of other WTO Members to engage in the business; and therefore (4) 
China has infringed its commitments relating to foreign investment 
in its banking sector.118   
Upon the adoption of the panel report China has been obliged to 
remedy its violations, although China has negotiated with the 
United States a reasonable period of time to do so, with the sides 
ultimately agreeing on a deadline of July 31, 2013.119 However, 
given the dominant role of the CUP and the Chinese government’s 
support for such a monopoly, it remains uncertain as to whether the 
government will take effective steps to actually allow access for 
foreign EPS suppliers. Further, any action taken by the government 
is unlikely to occur soon. In addition to the formal measures above, 
the capacity of foreign banks to introduce new financial products 
has still been limited by red tape.120 The dominant control of the big 
four state banks over the RMB business has continued to 
significantly restrain the capability of foreign banks to acquire 
sufficient RMB deposits and consequently to conduct RMB 
business.121 
All in all, China’s selective liberalization of its banking sector for 
FDI provides another illustration of its strategic implementation of 
WTO obligations. China has not only been reluctant to eliminate 
pre-WTO restrictions or conditions on FDI, but it has also created 
                                                
117  See Panel Report, China-Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, 
WT/DS413/R (July 16, 2012) (findings regarding legal requirements relating to electronic 
payment services maintained by China). 
118 Id. ¶¶7.571–575. 
119 World Trade Organization, China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment 
Services, Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, WT/DS413/8 (Nov. 26, 2012). 
120 M.K. Leung & Ricky Y.K. Chan, Are Foreign Banks Sure Winners in Post-WTO China, 
49 BUS. HORIZONS 221, 224 (2006). 
121 Id. at 224. 
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new entry barriers in this sector. When international obligations 
conflict with domestic goals, China’s strategy has been to protect 
domestic interests at the cost of foreign players without due regard 
to its WTO obligations. 
 CHINA’S WTO COMMITMENTS AND DOMESTIC 
REFORMS UNDER THE FINANCE REGIME 
The final key elements of China’s economic transformation 
have been its financial reforms and its integration into the 
international financial system. However, compared to China’s trade 
and investment regimes, the reform of its financial system has been 
relatively slow and inadequate, lagging behind overall economic 
reform and growth in China.122 At the forefront of contemporary 
debates has been China’s exchange rate policy. Below, we discuss 
this issue with a focus on China’s performance in the reforms of its 
foreign exchange regime and its observance of relevant international 
obligations.  
 China’s Foreign Exchange Regime 
China’s exchange rate policy reform can be generally divided into 
three phases: the pre-reform period (1949-1979), the reform period 
(1979-2005), and the 2005 reform.123 Prior to China’s reform and 
opening in 1979, the Chinese government had maintained rigid 
controls over the value and convertibility of RMB with foreign 
currencies. The RMB exchange rate was fixed at a considerable 
overvalue (i.e. RMB 1.5 to a US dollar) for the purpose of 
facilitating the importation of capital goods necessary for domestic 
                                                
122 Maria M.N. DaCosta & Jennifer P.N. Foo, China’s Financial System: Two Decades of 
Gradual Reforms, 28 MANAGERIAL FIN 3, 3 (2002). 
123 The description of the evolution of foreign exchange policy reforms below is largely 
based on Morris Goldstein & Nicholas R. Lardy, The Future of China's Exchange Rate 
Policy, 87 POL’Y ANALYSES INT’L ECON. 3 (2009); The People’s Bank of China (PBC), 
China: the Evolution of Foreign Exchange Controls and the Consequences of Capital 
Flows, in Bank for International Settlements ed., Financial Globalisation and Emerging 
Market Capital Flows, 44 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 143 (2008)[hereinafter PBC]; 
Larry L. Drumm, Changing Money: Foreign Exchange Reform in the People's Republic of 
China, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.REV. 359 (1995); Toshiki Kanamori & Zhijun Zhao, 
The Renminbi Exchange Rate Revaluation: Theory, Practice and Lessons from Japan, 1–
12 (Asian Development Bank Institute 2006) . 
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industrial development. In order to maintain the value of the RMB, 
the Chinese government introduced policies which restricted the 
circulation and holding of foreign currencies within its territory, 
required the deposit of foreign exchange earnings in the BOC and 
strictly controlled the outflow of foreign capital.  This excessive 
RMB overvaluation severely constrained the exportation of 
domestically-made goods and foreign investment into China.  
The Chinese government has since gradually relaxed these 
restrictions on foreign exchange and substantially devalued the 
RMB. In 1979, the Chinese government introduced a scheme to 
allow the retention of a certain portion of foreign exchange earnings 
by exporters and local governments. Since 1985, Chinese residents 
have been allowed to hold, deposit and withdraw foreign currencies, 
subject to specified upper limits. In 1986, the Chinese government 
approved the creation of foreign exchange markets, or swap centers, 
for Chinese enterprises to conduct RMB and foreign exchange 
trading under the supervision of the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) and its predecessor. This was accompanied by 
expanding the application of the foreign exchange retention scheme 
to include all domestic entities, not just entities engaging in export.  
Simultaneously, China introduced a duel-exchange rate regime, 
under which an official exchange rate and a swap market rate 
operated concurrently. This duel-exchange rate regime was 
abolished in 1994 and “a unified managed floating exchange rate 
regime based on market supply and demand” was instituted.124 
Under this new regime, the two rates were unified “by moving the 
official rate to the then prevailing swap market rate” at around RMB 
8.7 to a dollar.125 The foreign exchange retention scheme was then 
replaced by an interbank system, under which the sale and purchase 
of foreign exchange had to be conducted through authorized foreign 
exchange banks. In 1996, the Chinese government removed 
restrictions on foreign exchange for all transactions under the 
current account involving trade in goods and services.   
This basket of changes constituted major steps in reforming 
China’s exchange rate policy from a centrally based system to a 
market-based system. However, the Chinese government was far 
                                                
124 The People’s Bank of China, supra note 123, at 149. 
125 Goldstein & Lardy, supra note 123, at 6. 
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from prepared to adopt a fully floating exchange rate regime. Under 
this ‘managed float’ regime, the nominal exchange rate of RMB was 
pegged to the dollar at RMB 8.28 to a dollar, a rate that remained 
almost unchanged until 2005. Furthermore, in contrast with the full 
RMB convertibility under the current account, capital account 
convertibility was yet to be liberalized except for inbound and 
outbound FDI projects and a limited range of other transactions.126 
In July 2005, the People’s Bank of China issued a policy 
announcement to further adjust the exchange rate regime, moving 
from a “de facto peg to the US dollar” to a system under which the 
RMB is pegged to a basket of foreign currencies and is allowed to 
“fluctuate by up to 0.3% (later changed to 0.5% in 2007 and 1% in 
2012) on a daily basis against the basket.”127 The introduction of this 
new system signaled the willingness of the Chinese government to 
continue to move toward a more flexible market-based exchange 
rate regime.128 Thanks to the operation of the system, the nominal 
exchange rate of RMB appreciated by around 30% to RMB 6.35 to 
a dollar by the end of 2011.129 Despite this further reform and the 
appreciation of the RMB, the Chinese government has maintained a 
“managed float” regime130 under which measures have been taken to 
keep the RMB exchange rate stable. In order to offset upward 
pressure on the RMB, the PBC has continued to purchase foreign 
currency since 2001, which has led to massive accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves. 131  In the meantime, the Chinese 
authorities have maintained stringent controls over the capital 
account, inter alia, by subjecting foreign exchange inflows and 
                                                
126 See generally Nicholas Lardy & Patrick Douglass, Capital Account Liberalization and 
the Role of the Renminbi (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper 11-6, 2011); PBC, 
supra note 123, at 143–44. 
127 Public Announcement of the People's Bank of China on Reforming the RMB Exchange 
Rate Regime, No. 16, issued and effective on July 21, 2005, available at 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn:8080/publish/english/955/2001/20014/20014_.html; WAYNE M. 
MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21625, CHINA'S CURRENCY: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 2 (2011). See JONATHAN ANDERSON, UBS INV. 
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128 Goldstein & Lardy, supra note 123, at 11. 
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130 Regulations on Foreign Exchange System of the People’s Republic of China, Decree 
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131 See Goldstein & Lardy, supra note 123, at 21–24; Branstetter & Lardy, supra note 77, 
at 42.  
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outflows under the capital account to regulatory approvals and the 
utilization of foreign capital remitted into China for regulatory 
supervision.132  
The Chinese government has been criticized for manipulating its 
currency, frequently with reference to economic studies which 
reveal that the RMB exchange rate has been significantly 
undervalued and would have appreciated faster, and to a greater 
extent, in the absence of the government interventions.133 Critics 
allege that China’s currency regulation and the resultant 
undervaluation of the RMB have created an unfair competitive 
advantage for Chinese exports.134 However, the Chinese government 
maintains that the purpose of its regulation is to “foster economic 
stability through currency stability,” which is essential to China’s 
economic development and growth.135 In response to the pressure on 
RMB appreciation, the Chinese government has begun to reduce 
value-added tax (VAT) rebates for exporters and has eliminated 
rebates on many export products. 136  This indicates that the 
“management” of the RMB exchange rate serves policy priorities 
other than just providing financial support to exporters. One such 
policy consideration concerns the vulnerability of China’s banking 
system. China’s banking sector is still struggling with three key 
challenges: (i) the non-performing loans of major commercial 
banks,137 (ii) the low profitability of state-owned banks, and (iii) the 
over reliance on household savings as a funding source.138 It has thus 
                                                
132 See Regulations on Foreign Exchange System of the People’s Republic of China, supra 
note 130, arts. 21–23; Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze Ning Leung, Is China a “Currency 
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been observed that the stability of the RMB exchange rate is 
essential to the stability, ongoing reform and growth of China’s 
banking industry.139 Accordingly, it has been suggested that further 
reforms of China’s exchange rate system need to go hand in hand 
with “further strengthening of the banking system – and of the 
financial system more broadly.”140 Without a strong banking system, 
it is also advisable for China to keep the capital account relatively 
closed so as to avoid capital flight and the insolvency of local banks 
and firms that may result. 141  The perils of financial sector 
liberalization preceding enhanced prudential regulation were well 
established by the Asian economic crisis of 1997.142 The stability of 
the RMB exchange rate has also been regarded as being essential to 
stabilizing employment in the export sector and ensuring social 
stability, both of which are fundamental to the further economic 
growth of China. 143  China’s policy priority has shifted from 
promoting exports to preventing social unrest and promoting 
China’s overall economic growth by “managing” the pace of RMB 
appreciation.  
Opinions are divided as to whether the Chinese government’s 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets has constituted a 
breach of China’s international obligations under the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the WTO.144 As a member of the 
IMF, China is obliged to comply with the rules set out in the IMF 
Articles of Agreement145, including Article IV, which contains the 
key obligations regarding exchange arrangements. According to 
Article IV:2, a member is free to determine the exchange rate 
regime that it intends to apply as long as this regime does not run 
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counter to the member’s obligations under Article IV:1. Article 
IV:1(iii) prohibits a member from “manipulating exchange rates or 
the international monetary system in order to prevent effective 
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over other members” (emphasis added). Article IV:3 
mandates the IMF to “oversee the compliance of each member with 
its obligations under [Article IV:1].” In 2007, the executive board of 
the IMF adopted an amended decision on “Bilateral Surveillance 
over Members’ Policies”146 providing guidance for the exercise of 
the oversight function of the Fund.  
One guide, relating to the obligations under Article IV:1, provides 
that the Fund shall consider and may initiate discussion with a 
member who, among other things, is involved in “(i) protracted 
large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market.” 
Those who label China as a currency manipulator argue the Chinese 
government’s long-lasting intervention in the foreign exchange 
markets to resist RMB appreciation has constituted a violation of 
Article IV:1(iii) of the IMF Agreement.147 Other observers have 
expressed the view that any challenge against China under Article 
IV:1(iii) is unlikely to succeed because the embedded “intent” 
element of that provision would be hard to establish – China’s 
intervention may well serve policy objectives other than the 
prevention of effective balance of payments adjustment or the 
creation of an unfair trade advantage for Chinese exports.148 As 
discussed above, our analysis shows that the Chinese government 
has been seeking to safeguard domestic financial and social 
stabilities that are fundamental to China’s economic growth. 
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Allegations of China’s violations of its IMF obligations, especially 
under Article IV:1(iii), thus seem to be difficult to maintain. In 
addition, China’s achievement of current account convertibility is 
consistent with Article VIII:2(a) of the IMF Agreement, which 
prohibits members from “impos[ing] restrictions on the making of 
payments and transfers for current international transactions.” By 
contrast, the Fund Agreement does not similarly prohibit members’ 
restrictions on capital account convertibility. China’s imposition of 
capital account limitations is therefore not in breach of its 
obligations under the Fund.149 
Debates on the WTO-legality of China’s exchange rate policy 
have mainly been based on Article XV:4 of the GATT and, more 
frequently, the prohibition of export subsidies under the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement). GATT Article XV:4 prohibits WTO Members from 
taking exchange actions which frustrate the intent of the GATT. 
Despite allegations that China’s “management” of the RMB 
exchange rate has infringed Article XV:4,150 many commentators 
have observed that it is difficult to successfully challenge China’s 
foreign exchange policy under Article XV:4.151 This is because the 
legal obligations under Article XV:4 are too vague to be effectively 
enforced in practice and are unlikely to be interpreted by the WTO 
tribunals in such a way as to condemn China. The SCM Agreement 
prohibits export subsidies, and whether China’s exchange regime 
has amounted to such an export subsidy within the meaning of the 
SCM Agreement is also controversial. According to Articles 1.1, 2, 
and 3 of the SCM Agreement, for a measure to constitute an export 
subsidy, the measure must: (1) be a governmental financial 
contribution, (2) confer a benefit to a recipient, and (3) be specific 
in the sense that it provides a subsidy to a specific industry or group 
of industries. Presently, the subsidy must also be contingent on 
export performance.  
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Opinions are divided as to whether the Chinese government’s 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets satisfies all three 
conditions. 152  A significant number of leading analysts have 
recognized the difficulties in establishing each of the criteria for the 
WTO tribunals, in particular the requirement of specificity. Even if 
the Chinese government was found to have financially assisted 
Chinese exporters, its intervention would not be treated as an export 
subsidy if the alleged financial support was not solely afforded to 
Chinese exporters and the support was aimed at achieving 
macroeconomic objectives other than export performance.153 In short, 
it is unlikely that China’s “management” of the RMB exchange rate 
has violated WTO rules under either the GATT Article XV:4 or the 
SCM Agreement.  
While there may not be enough evidence to prove a violation of 
the WTO rules. China’s action still lead to another question.  
Specifically, has China’s regulation of its exchange regime 
constituted strategic implementation of its international obligations? 
Compared to its trade and investment reforms, it is much less clear 
whether China’s exchange policy reforms conflict with existing 
multilateral rules. Certainly, the reforms in all three areas have 
aimed to stimulate China’s transition to a market-based economy, 
reform and develop domestic industries and strengthen the nation’s 
overall economic growth. However, China has approached these 
aims differently in each area. While reforming its trade and 
investment regimes, China has deliberately ignored certain WTO 
obligations that it considered to be inconsistent with the level of 
development of certain sensitive industries, such as the automotive 
industry, cultural industry and banking industry. By doing so, China 
has strategically implemented its WTO commitments for its own 
economic interests, at the cost of the interests of its trading partners.  
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In contrast, China has endeavored to meet its multilateral 
commitments in its foreign exchange reform. China has successfully 
utilized its international obligations to facilitate domestic reforms 
while at the same time exploiting “loopholes” or “grey areas” in 
multilateral rules to manage the pace of reforms. For example, in 
order to comply with Article VIII:2(a) of the IMF Agreement, China 
has liberalized the current account by removing restrictions on RMB 
convertibility for transactions involving trade in goods and services. 
Accordingly, this liberalization is in China’s interest because it 
coincides with its liberalization in trades of goods and services 
pursuant to its commitments under the WTO. In retrospect, this 
liberalization has played an important role in promoting exports, 
bringing a desirable level of foreign competition, and stimulating 
other aspects of economic reform and development in China. 
Moreover, even though there are no IMF requirements for China to 
liberalize the capital account, the Chinese government has allowed, 
to different degrees, RMB convertibility in inward FDI projects and, 
more recently, outward foreign investment transactions by Chinese 
enterprises.154 This has significantly contributed to attracting FDI 
and encouraging competent domestic enterprises to do business 
overseas.  
Finally, while the Chinese government has allowed steady 
RMB appreciation in response to overwhelming pressure from the 
international community (especially the United States), the 
government seems to have taken a firm position that the progress of 
exchange regime reform and the RMB exchange rate must be 
regulated so as to avoid unwanted social and financial problems. 
Considering the fragility of China’s financial system and various 
other economic sectors, a step-by-step reform with reasonable 
government regulation seems to be more socially and economically 
sound than a fully-liberalized reform. Meanwhile, despite external 
pressure from diplomatic channels, the Chinese government has 
insisted that its intervention in the exchange regime is not in 
contravention of any treaty obligations.  
Even if China’s exchange regime was found to violate the IMF 
Agreement or/and the WTO Agreement, it is likely that China 
would continue to regulate its exchange regime in pursuit of 
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domestic policy and economic goals. Since China has explicitly 
engaged in selective implementation of WTO obligations in the 
reform of its trade and investment regimes, it is reasonable to 
anticipate that China would undertake a similar strategic approach 
to reforms of its exchange regime, if required. It has been observed 
that the IMF’s influence on China’s behavior and practice would be 
quite limited even if China were found to be in breach of IMF rules, 
due to the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism and a lack of 
leverage attributable to China not needing IMF financing.155 Under 
the WTO, the most likely allegation is probably that by suppressing 
the price of the RMB, the Chinese government has subsidized the 
export sector in the form of (prohibited) export subsidies. However, 
as discussed above,any attempted challenges against China on the 
ground of currency subsidies would be difficult to substantiate. This 
is partly why the United States Department of Commerce (USDOC) 
has consistently refused to instigate petitions against China’s 
currency subsidies.156 In addition, the USDOC is probably unwilling 
to deal with this longstanding political hot potato. As Magnus and 
Brightbill have observed,  
Such an investigation would admittedly be dramatic, 
and perhaps even traumatic. It would push Commerce 
to the centre of the political spotlight concerning a 
difficult international issue on which the Treasury 
Department has led for many years. And merely 
preparing, much less actually sending to the Chinese 
Government, a CVD questionnaire aimed at eliciting 
information that would be needed to make a “benefit” 
determination on currency would create diplomatic 
shockwaves.157 
Thus, while the Chinese government has been under pressure to 
allow the RMB to appreciate according to the demand and supply of 
the market, China has also exerted considerable pressure on its 
western counterparts, including the United States, to avoid 
escalation of this issue to formal disputes or even trade wars. Given 
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the firm stance of China and the stakes associated with keeping the 
RMB stable, it is likely that the Chinese government will maintain 
its controls over the foreign exchange markets regardless of legal 
challenges, sanctions or retaliations from western countries either 
taken unilaterally or under the WTO. 
 CONCLUSION         
The rules of China’s engagement with the global trading system 
were set by the West in the accession negotiations, and the West has 
received enormous economic benefits from China’s rise. Despite 
this, our initial research suggests that it is China who has most 
skilfully navigated the rules governing its interaction with the rest of 
the world, and implemented its international obligations so as to 
protect its national agenda.   
A full assessment would require a multi-year research project 
and the results would fill at least one major volume. Short of such 
an exercise, an appraisal such as this will be necessarily somewhat 
subjective and partial. However, the snapshot we have taken 
provides a useful starting point for evaluating who has best utilized 
the international economic legal order. Our research suggests that 
China has proven highly adept at furthering its national interests in 
the application and implementation of, and strategic compliance 
with, the rules governing the global economic system. While 
reforming its trade and investment regimes, the Chinese government 
has enforced the rules that have suited it and disregarded the 
international obligations that have conflicted with its domestic goals. 
Conversely, China’s financial reforms have mostly satisfied its 
multilateral commitments but often very slowly and well after 
compliance was due. The West, for its part, has pushed more softly 
than it might have for full and strict compliance – despite having set 
these rules.  
There can be no doubting that, for a newcomer to the global 
regulatory regime, China has proven exceptionally skilful at 
bending or selectively ignoring the rules to favor itself. 
 
 
